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THE REGULATION OF CREATIVITY UNDER THE
WIPO INTERNET TREATIES
Ruth L. Okediji*
INTRODUCTION
After seven years and intense, breathtaking negotiations of Hollywoodstyle epic proportions, a copyright law for the digital age was born.1 The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty2
(WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty3 (WPPT)
(collectively, the WIPO Internet Treaties) opened for signature in 1996 and
entered into force in 2002,4 officially ushering global copyright law into the
information age. Both the WCT and WPPT formally acknowledged the
“profound” impact of information and communication technologies on the
creation and use of literary and artistic works, and on the production and
use of performances and phonograms. The legal framework established
was to facilitate “adequate solutions to questions raised by new economic,

* William L. Prosser Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful
to Mary Rumsey and Tomas Felcman for research assistance. This essay is based on a
keynote address delivered at Case Western Reserve University School of Law’s Symposium,
The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaties: 10 Years Later, on November 10, 2006, and a
presentation given at Fordham Law School’s When Worlds Collide Symposium on
November 1, 2008.
1. JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: THE WIPO
COPYRIGHT TREATY AND THE WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY:
COMMENTARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 3–4 (2002) (citing 1989 as the first stirrings of work
toward the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (WCT) and
noting that the first session of the Committee of Experts on a Possible Instrument for the
Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms was held in 1993).
2. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT].
3. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
4. For a treaty to enter into force means it has become binding between the parties that
have ratified or acceded to it. Both treaties required thirty states to ratify or accede before
they entered into force. See WPPT, supra note 3, art. 29; WCT, supra note 2, art. 21. The
WCT entered into force on March 6, 2002; the WPPT followed suit on May 20, 2002. The
WCT had seventy parties as of March 22, 2009. WIPO, Contracting Parties—WCT,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last visited Mar.
22, 2009) [hereinafter WCT Contracting Parties]. As of the same date, the WPPT had sixtyeight
signatories.
WIPO,
Contracting
Parties—WPPT,
http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=20 (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
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social, cultural and technological developments.”5 Less than a decade after
becoming law, it is fair to say that the WIPO Internet Treaties are far less
salient in the current policy and legal considerations about how knowledge
creation might best be encouraged and sustained in the online context.
Like prior copyright treaties, the WCT and the WPPT pivot on the
contested utilitarianism that defines modern international copyright law,
namely, that proprietary incentives are a critical requirement for knowledge
creation.6 But digital technologies have disrupted long-settled canons of
the classic copyright defense in at least some fundamental ways.7 First,
digital technologies have made it possible to overcome characteristic public
goods limitations by perfecting authorial control over terms of access to
creative works. As firmly established business models failed to capture rent
through the full range of exploitation made possible by digital technologies,
copyright owners sought a presumptive fiat over the architecture that made
use and distribution over digital networks a pervasive feature of
contemporary social interaction. Second, the phenomenon of social
networking occasioned an acute shift in the cultural-turned-market realities
confronting content proprietors. The rise of Web 2.0 illustrated clearly a
truth muted by the regimented world of print works, namely, that robust
creativity and corresponding economic success require users’ ability to
access and fully engage creative content across a spectrum of formats and
devices. Given the unrestrained versatility of innovation in the digital
arena, the WIPO Internet Treaties have fallen considerably short in what
was to be their central mission, namely, to provide a relevant and credible
source of norms to facilitate knowledge creation in the global digital
context.
This is not to say, however, that the WCT and the WPPT have not
affected copyright law and doctrine in ways beyond what the participants
imagined at the end of the diplomatic conference that yielded the
substantive texts.8 Academic commentary describing the perceived
victories of the conference for copyright’s age old balancing act between
incentives and access led to euphoric headlines such as Africa 1 Hollywood
0,9 which hailed an outcome that many agreed recognized public-oriented
considerations in the design of global copyright.10 In the midst of the
5. See WPPT, supra note 3, pmbl.; WCT, supra note 2, pmbl.
6. WCT, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 4.
7. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 54–159 (2008).
8. For examples of some of the unintended consequences of U.S. implementation of the
WCT, see ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: TEN YEARS UNDER THE
DMCA (2008), available at http://www.eff.org/files/DMCAUnintended10.pdf.
9. See John Browning, Africa 1 Hollywood 0, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 61; see also
Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 61 [hereinafter
Samuelson, Big Media]; Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134
[hereinafter Samuelson, The Copyright Grab].
10. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369,
370–71 (1997) (noting that, as concluded, the treaties “are more compatible with traditional

OKEDIJI FINAL

2009]

4/10/2009 9:16:32 AM

THE WIPO INTERNET TREATIES

2381

celebration over what did not happen in Geneva, given the ambitious
agenda of copyright proprietors,11 there was express acknowledgement that
what hung in the balance was the future of consumer interaction with new
digital technologies and, specifically, how copyright law would mold that
future.12 Looking back now, it seems presumptuous to have arrogated such
centripetal power to copyright doctrine when the treaties were intentionally
far less concerned with enabling new modes of creative enterprise than
preserving the existing presumptions in favor of authorial prerogative.13
Given copyright’s vintage history, seven years into this new digital
copyright era may be too early to say with confidence that the future is here.
But certainly, key features of that future have emerged and, in the view of
many, remain troubling. Recent judicial decisions in the United States,
however, also indicate a readiness to limit the role of the WIPO Internet
Treaties in defining the conditions in which copyright owners may co-opt
the digital world and constrain the use of knowledge goods online.
Part I of this essay briefly reviews the environment from which the
WIPO Internet Treaties emerged, focusing in particular on the status of the
treaties as special agreements under Article 20 of the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention).14 I
discuss how this designation foreshadowed some of the ensuing
developments in international copyright law, specifically by extending a
worn paradigm of copyright relations between authors and users that fails to
account for the dynamic and iterative nature of the creative enterprise in the

principles of U.S. copyright law than was the high-protectionist agenda that U.S. officials
initially sought to promote in Geneva”); see also David Nimmer, A Tale of Two Treaties:
Dateline: Geneva-December 1996, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (1997) (“It was the
best of times, it was the worst of times. It was a far, far better copyright treaty than any the
world had ever attempted before. It began with Great Expectations; by the end, the
participants felt, if not quite like Les Misérables, at least as if they had emerged from a Bleak
House.”).
11. See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 370–71.
12. Id. at 372 (describing the negotiations as “a battle about the future of copyright in the
global information society” (citing Mihály Ficsor, Towards a Global Solution: The Digital
Agenda of the Berne Protocol and the New Instrument, in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 111, 118–22 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996); Bruce Lehman,
Intellectual Property and the National and Global Information Infrastructures, in THE
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 103, 103–09)); Browning,
supra note 9, at 63 (“[The conference] did not give copyright holders many of the new legal
powers they asked for—mostly because delegates feared that they would use those powers to
force the future into the mold of the past, and so rob the Net of its potential to create
change.”).
13. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK:
POLICY, LAW AND USE §§ 5.222–5.227, at 271–72 [hereinafter WIPO HANDBOOK], available
at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/ch5.pdf.
“During the
preparatory work, an agreement emerged that the transmission of works on the Internet and
in similar networks should be the object of an exclusive right of authorization of the author
or other copyright owner, with appropriate exceptions.” Id. at 271.
14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on Sept. 29, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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digital age, including the significance of digital copyright rules on scientific
research.15
Part II analyzes the new rights introduced by the WCT and evaluates
their import for traditional copyright concerns. I suggest that, far from
harmonizing copyright law with respect to rights in the digital arena, the
WCT instead introduced a greater deference to national copyright laws that
the Berne Convention had long sought to diminish with respect to
traditional copyright. Although initially such deference produced national
legislative outcomes that inordinately undermined knowledge creation and
the corresponding public interest therein, there is a deepening and
unrelenting call for global action,16 and some positive national responses,17
that could address the access and innovation deficit associated with an
unbalanced international copyright regime.
Part III briefly surveys domestic implementation of the WCT based on a
WIPO study and explores how national trends in this regard fall short of
addressing the spectrum of use attendant to digital works, information
networks, and their relationship to the commercial success of new
technologies. Finally, I question the role and expediency of participation by
developing and least-developed countries (DCs & LDCs), whose agency
was critical to the entry into force of the WIPO Internet Treaties. The
regulation of creativity by the treaties in no way acknowledges the
collaborative forms of creative engagement with which citizens in the
global South have long identified, nor the cultural relativity of copyright’s
most enduring cannons. The social and legal recognition of new forms of
creativity expressed through digital technologies offers an important
opportunity to reconsider how international copyright law might
accommodate a dynamic collage of incentives to support the innovative
process across geographical, cultural, and technological boundaries.18 In
15. See generally Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the Information
Society: Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and What Policy Makers
Should Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103 (2006); Jerome H. Reichman & Paul F.
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, Winter/Spring
2003, at 315.
16. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS & TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 3 (Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman eds., 2005); Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme
Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable Public
Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981
(2007).
17. See, e.g., Commission Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, at 3,
4–6, COM (2008) 466/3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/
copyright-infso/greenpaper_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2009) (setting forth a number of
issues connected with the role of copyright in the digital age in order to “foster a debate on
how knowledge for research, science and education can best be disseminated in the online
environment”).
18. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151, 1178–92 (2007); Paul E. Geller, Beyond the Copyright Crisis: Principles for
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the meantime, however, for both developed countries and DCs/LDCs,
sustainable creativity may require ongoing reliance on noncopyright
regimes, such as consumer law, competition policy, and human rights.19
Already, these regimes have attracted attention as mechanisms to secure the
benefits and opportunities of access to and use of existing knowledge goods
that once were left solely for copyright to bestow on her global audience.
I. TECHNOLOGY, AUTHORSHIP, AND CONSUMERISM
A. Copyright and Technology: Antecedents on the Road to Geneva
Technology and copyright have long shared an intimate relationship, and
it is routine to describe copyright law as the product of technological
change.20 From the printed word to maps, charts, and functional objects
that today comprise, for example, architectural works,21 copyright has
simultaneously mediated the relationship between authors and their works
on the one hand, between users and copyrighted works on the other, and
between the two inter se. In the classic copyright story, “authors” and
“users” are protagonists who occupy distinct spaces and react to copyright
differently. Accordingly, the law speaks to one or the other, but never to
both simultaneously or with the same concerns.22 Authors are to be
Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165, 170 (2008) (accentuating “the truism that
culture is enriched as it is fed back for each of us autonomously to elaborate”).
19. See, e.g., Natali Helberger & P. Bernt Hugenholtz, No Place Like Home for Making
a Copy: Private Copying in European Copyright Law and Consumer Law, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1061 (2007); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 49–
50 (2004).
20. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430
(1984) (“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment—
the printing press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.” (footnote
omitted)); H.R. REP. NO. 104-554, at 6 (1996) (“The Copyright Act was last generally
revised in 1976, in response to the many technological changes that had occurred since the
enactment of the 1909 Act. Since 1976, Congress regularly has had to address new issues,
especially those raised by new technologies or new methods of exploitation.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 101-735, at 7 (1990) (“Even though the 1976 Copyright Act was carefully drafted to be
flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, technology has a habit of outstripping
even the most flexible statutes. Copyright is, in large part, a response to new technology.”);
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX
21 (Stanford Univ. Press, rev. ed. 2003) (1994) (noting that copyright has always been
“technology’s child”); Douglas Reid Weimer, Digital Audio Recording Technology:
Challenges to American Copyright Law, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 491 (1990) (“Over the
years, American copyright law has evolved in order to respond to societal and technological
changes.”).
21. See John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing
Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner
Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301, 308 n.41 (2005) (tracing evolution and expansion of the
subjects of copyright protection to the inclusion of architectural works).
22. For criticism of this binary approach and arguments in favor of a more developed
construction of the consumer in copyright law, see Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of
the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003).
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protected by copyright as the fountain of creative expression by which
social welfare will be enhanced; users are to be at once benefited by having
access to protected works, but also constrained by copyright to preserve the
incentives that pervade the utilitarian scheme. For much of its history, then,
a presumptive cloak woven from notions of an authorial process in which
literary works emerge solely from the mind of a single person called an
“author,” rather than a “user,” has hung heavily on the copyright frame and
powerfully shaped considerations of copyright’s allocation of proprietary
rights.23
The image of copyright law’s audience as passive recipients and/or inert
absorbers of content became the subject of increasing scholarly criticism24
just as the emergence of digital technology revealed in concrete, practical
terms the inadequacy of this conceptual framework. The consumer
electronics revolution of the late 1980s,25 which presaged the digital
revolution, altered how consumers could access and experience creative
works on a scale akin perhaps to how the printing press changed how
owners could control access to and copying of literary works. By the late
1990s, the ubiquity of the Internet over the mundane and the sublime
aspects of daily life engendered a symmetry between owners and users of
digital works, concurrently empowering the capacity of both groups to
reach markets with protected works in unprecedented fashion. Owners and
consumers were equally disrupted from their settled expectations
surrounding the production, distribution, and experience of the creative
enterprise;26 but, very quickly, owners seized upon the imprimatur of
23. For criticisms of this view of the individual “romantic” author, see, for example,
Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 302, 319–20 (1992) [hereinafter Jaszi, On the Author
Effect]; Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,”
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 458–60; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965–
66 (1990) (“Our copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create something
from nothing, that works owe their origin to the authors who produce them.” (citing 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 1.06[A] , 201[A], at 28.1, (1989)); Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 288–92 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151, 1179 (2007) (noting the “conventional dichotomies between author and
consumer, author and imitator, author and improver, and author and critic that pervade the
copyright literature”). See also generally Jaszi, On the Author Effect, supra note 23
(summarizing various critiques of the author concept); Litman, supra note 23; Liu, supra
note 22.
25. See Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer
Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51,
92 (2006) (identifying the “infancy” of the consumer electronics revolution as of 1980);
David L. Glotzer, Note, Reading Between the Lines: High Definition Television, Antitrust
Reform and America’s Chance to Get Back into the Television Business, 10 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 127, 136 (1991) (referring to “CDs in the 1980s” as a “major revolution in the
consumer electronics industry”).
26. Digital media are leading industries and consumers “to abandon the central reality of
modern economic life—the market exchange of property between sellers and buyers.”
JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM, WHERE ALL
OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE 4 (2000); see also Paul Ganley, Digital Copyright and the
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copyright title to assert priority in considerations of what new rights might
be needed to fully exploit the new media to distribute works, while also
controlling access and use.27 Underlying the presumption of authorial
ascendancy was a more complex set of ideals that viewed the digital arena
as no more than another technological stage that justified copyright status
with regard to treating owners as the only indispensable actors in
formulating the copyright bargain.
In practice, however, courts have long recognized the illusoriness of a
stark author/consumer distinction. Justice Joseph Story’s well-known
depiction of the creative process in Emerson v. Davies28 identified copying
as an essential part of authorial ingenuity,29 a fact that is very much woven
into copyright doctrine today.30 Indeed, copying in some cases has been

New Creative Dynamics, 12 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 282, 302–03 (2004) (“Consumers seem
eager to immerse themselves in a digital entertainment market whilst the industry clings to
antiquated conceptions of the copy and redundant distribution channels.”); Michael P.
Matesky II, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Non-infringing Use: Can
Mandatory Labeling of Digital Media Products Keep the Sky From Falling?, 80 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 515, 516 (2005) (noting impact of technology on consumers’ expectations about fair
use).
27. See WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: A
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS pt. II (1994), available at http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/bytopic/intprop/ipwg/
(describing how technology can be used to control distribution of, and access to, protected
works); WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 177 (1995), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (“Concurrently, copyright owners are
developing and implementing technical solutions to facilitate the delivery of protected works
in an easy, consumer-friendly yet reliable and secure way. These solutions enable copyright
owners not only to protect their works against unauthorized access, reproduction,
manipulation, distribution, performance or display, but also serve to assure the integrity of
these works and to address copyright management and licensing concerns.”).
28. 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (“The thoughts of every man are,
more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and expressed . . . . If no book
could be the subject of copy-right which was not new and original in the elements of which
it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right in modern times, and we should
be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence.”).
29. Copying is valued in some cultures as a symbol of respect and high honor. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 29 (1995) (noting that in ancient Chinese culture, copying
“bore witness to the quality of the work copied and to its creator’s degree of understanding
and civility”). Korean culture also viewed copying not as an offense, but as a
“recommended activity, reflecting a passion for learning.” See Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki
Kim, The Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea,
13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 118, 120 (1994); see also Assafa Endeshaw, Intellectual Property
Enforcement in Asia: A Reality Check, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 378, 385 (2005) (“On
the other hand, Asian attitudes towards the concept of intellectual property appear to
coalesce. Imitation or copying from works of other people is not generally viewed as
illegitimate or, even, questionable.”); Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal and
Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996).
30. See Litman, supra note 23, at 966–67, 970–77; Liu, supra note 22, at 405–20.
Nowhere is copying more entrenched into copyright than in the context of derivative works.
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recognized by courts as “original” enough to warrant protection by
copyright.31 Yet, with the facility of digital technology, copying appeared
to have lost any authorial virtue or legal value. Instead, the prospect of
mass-scale copying of digital works resurrected the passive image of
copyright’s audience with ever greater force and inflexibility. The
increased autonomy, privacy, secrecy, and ease with which copyrighted
works could be used or enjoyed generated immense angst in the
entertainment industry, particularly over the security of traditional
The author-consumer/
copyright rights in a digital environment.32
consumer-author spectrum was suppressed in the ensuing forceful discourse
over how best to serve the public interest in view of the capacity inherent in
digital networks to engender untold nefarious activities with respect to
creative works. Domestic efforts in the United States to retool copyright for
the digital environment focused almost entirely on how digital technologies
could facilitate greater rent from uses of copyrighted works, not on how
copyright law might be recalibrated to stimulate creative output, effective
dissemination, and user participation in the creative process. Initial
proposals were radical at best and outrageously audacious—calling for
control by the copyright owner over all digital reproductions of works
transmitted over the Internet, even those reproduced in temporary form;33
elimination of the first-sale doctrine;34 elimination of fair use when
licensing of the work is possible;35 and giving control to owners over every
digital transmission.36 In addition, there were proposals for technological
protection and anticircumvention measures to secure the expanded menu of
proposed rights.37

See also Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983).
31. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“‘[W]hile a copy of something in the public domain will not, if it be merely a copy, support
a copyright, a distinguishable variation will.’” (quoting Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris &
Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927))); Phoenix Renovation Corp. v. Rodriguez,
439 F. Supp. 2d 510, 516 (E.D. Va. 2006) (“Originality in this context ‘means little more
than a prohibition of actual copying.’ No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s
addition’, it is enough if it be his own.” (quoting M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d
421, 438 (4th Cir. 1986))); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
32. See, e.g., Lucy Cradduck & Adrian Mccullagh, Designing Copyright TPM: A
Mutant Digital Copyright, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 155, 165 (2005) (describing industry
fears over unauthorized distribution via the Internet); Matt Richtel, Surfing for Music,
POPULAR SCI., Sept. 1, 1999, at 70 (noting that “Web music” threatens the industry’s
business model); Yoshiko Hara & Junko Yoshida, Code Hack Prompts Delay of DVD-Audio
Launch, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Dec. 3, 1999, available at
http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=18303366 (describing the “immediate
threat” of copying digital audio DVD disks).
33. See Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, supra note 9, at 136.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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As is well known, the avid efforts to secure large-scale transformation of
copyright law for the digital age were not initially successful on the U.S.
domestic front,38 and ultimately the terrain for this great contest became
WIPO.39 There, with the concerted and coordinated efforts of DC
negotiators, civil society groups, private industry representatives, and
coalitions of scholars, research institutes, and libraries, an ambitious effort
to convert all the gains of the digital environment into surplus rent for
copyright owners was successfully rolled back—at least for that moment in
time. As the years have unfolded, and national implementation of the
WIPO Internet Treaties has taken distinct twists and turns, the sweet
success of the multilateral negotiations has gradually turned sour—at least
in some regards—for those who view copyright law as an instrument to be
used in pursuit of public ends that contemplate social gains from protection
of and access to creative works.
B. Never Too Strong: The Legal Design Context for the WIPO
Internet Treaties
As consumer technologies traversed the experiential space between
content and access,40 creative and consumptive processes became
38. See Meeka Jun & Steven D. Rosenboro, The WIPO Treaties: The International
Battle Over Copyright Cyberturf, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 1997, at 8, 8 (“The [National
Information Infrastructure (NII)] Task Force’s proposed Copyright Protection Act of 1995
(the NII Act) was fiercely opposed by internet service providers, telecommunications
companies, software manufacturers, the academic community and consumer advocacy
groups who were concerned that the NII’s restrictive policies would stymie the growth of the
net. As a result of their lobbying efforts, the NII Act failed to graduate from the Senate
committee level, despite strong support from the Clinton Administration.”); see also Stephen
Fraser, The Copyright Battle: Emerging International Rules and Roadblocks on the Global
Information Infrastructure, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 759, 782–83 (1997)
(noting the Clinton administration’s failure to obtain new rights holders’ protections in
Congress); Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for
Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 671 (2000) (“Having failed to obtain
Congressional enactment of the White Paper’s proposed legislation to expand the copyright
rights of digital content providers, the Clinton Administration reintroduced key elements of
the failed legislation as treaty proposals at the December 1996 World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) conference in Geneva.” (citing James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual
Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 101 (1997)); Samuelson, supra
note 10, at 410–11; Hannibal Travis, Comment, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure:
Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 833 (2000)
(same).
39. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization art. 3,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 848 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The objectives of the Organization are: (i)
to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation
among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international
organization, (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among the Unions.”).
40. See Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New
Model for U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 73 (2007) (“The falling
price of Internet access has made such modes of communication accessible to the mass
market. So too have the expanding array of places and devices from which consumers can
use the Internet, as well as the falling price of computers. Nearly all public libraries provide
Internet access and by 2004, most even had broadband access. Consumers can now reach
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inextricably and unavoidably linked, particularly on the Internet, where the
line drawing between authors and consumers was bound to be vexatious.41
Yet, copyright’s stubborn adherence to the author/consumer paradigm
remained adamantly pervasive; the WCT is modeled precisely along this
author/consumer axis as though digital networks posed no different
possibilities than past technologies, to which copyright responded primarily
by recognizing new subject matter and new types of rights for owners.42
Before turning to the substantive provisions of the WIPO Internet Treaties,
however, it is important first to describe the international legal framework
in which the treaties emerged.
In international copyright parlance, the WIPO Internet Treaties are
“special agreements” pursuant to Article 20 of the Berne Convention.43
Under this article, Berne member states can enter into copyright agreements
only if “such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those
granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to [the]
Convention.”44 This provision was intended to reflect the existing network
the Internet through cell phones and an array of small hand-held devices. With respect to
home computer access, from 1996 to 1999 computer prices fell by over 32% per year in the
United States. Since 1999, computer prices have only continued to fall, dropping over 16%
in 2005 alone.” (citing JOHN CARLO BERTOT, INFO. USE MGMT. & POLICY INST., PUBLIC
LIBRARIES AND THE INTERNET 2004: SURVEY RESULTS AND FINDINGS (2005), available at
http://www.ii.fsu.edu/plinternet_findings.cfm; Dale W. Jorgenson, U.S. Economic Growth in
the Information Age, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE EDITION, Fall 2001, tbl.1,
http://www.issues.org/18.1/jorgenson.html)); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code,
Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L.
REV. 505, 534–35 (2003) (“[Due to Napster, the] relevant universe of potential transaction
partners for copyright infringers was expanded to unprecedented levels. An individual,
aided by this technology, could easily engage in de maximus copyright infringement without
ever leaving his home.” (footnote omitted)); James Chapman, Note, Russian Web Sites
Jeopardize U.S. Users: The Dangers of Importing Copyrighted Material over the Internet,
29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 267, 274 (2006) (“With the advent of computer and
Internet technology, the cost of copying and distributing protected content has dramatically
decreased.”).
41. See Bradley A. Smith, A Moderate, Modern Campaign Finance Reform Agenda, 12
NEXUS 3, 10 (2007) (“The growth of YouTube since the 2004 election has led to the
creation of a growing number of video blogs. Not only can anyone operate a ‘cyber
newspaper,’ but increasingly most anyone can operate a ‘cyber television station.’” (footnote
omitted)); Joseph Gratz, Note, Reform in the “Brave Kingdom”: Alternative Compensation
Systems for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 399, 408–09 (2004)
(describing creation of “mash-ups”); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan
Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 664 (1997) (describing
“fan fiction” disseminated on the Internet).
42. See Aashit Shah, iBrief, UK’s Implementation of the Anti-circumvention Provisions
of the EU Copyright Directive: An Analysis, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3, ¶ 2, available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2004DLTR0003.pdf (noting that the
WCT “is principally aimed at adapting the legal paradigm of copyrights to new technology”
(citing Samuelson, supra note 10, at 378)).
43. REINBOTHE & LEWINSKI, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the WCT is a special
agreement under Berne); id. at 242–43 (stating that, although the WPPT does not explicitly
claim to be a special agreement, it should be considered one); see also MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE
LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION 591 (2002) (same).
44. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 20.
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of bilateral economic relations between member states, which had been
extensive prior to the negotiations for the Berne Convention and which was
likely to continue despite the nascent multilateral cooperation evidenced by
the convention.45 Given the minimalist approach to international copyright
protection that necessarily characterized the Berne Convention
negotiations,46 countries did not intend to foreclose the possibility of
bilateral agreements with higher levels of copyright protection on a
reciprocal basis than was afforded by Berne. Accordingly, the Berne Act47
incorporated two provisions to secure the negotiated multilateral baseline
for copyright protection. The first was an Additional Article that preserved
the legitimacy of existing agreements between member states that already
contained rights stronger than those agreed to in the Berne Convention or
that were “not contrary to [the] Convention.”48 The second provision,
contained in Article 15, reiterated the same standard for application to
future agreements between Berne signatories, namely, that bilateral “special
arrangements” could prospectively be concluded between member states,
but only so long as such arrangements conferred stronger rights or terms not
contrary to the provisions in the Berne Convention.
For the most part, the strategic and structural importance of these two
provisions has been overlooked by scholars and commentators.49 The
addition of these clauses to the design of the multilateral copyright
framework effectively foreclosed any legitimate possibility of reimagining
international copyright as anything but an ever-increasing strengthening of
authors’ rights.50 As a result of these provisions, several countries

45. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, at 25–38 (1987) (describing these relations). For a brief
discussion of various periods of bilateralism in international intellectual regulation from a
U.S. perspective, see Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in
International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 131–46
(2004).
46. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 104 (2000) (describing why the Berne Convention initially set minimal
levels of protection).
47. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
828 U.N.T.S. 221. The Berne Act was the first iteration of the convention.
48. RICKETSON, supra note 45, at 683–85 (providing the text of the Additional Article of
September 9, 1886).
49. But see Okediji, supra note 45; Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright
System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing
Countries (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev. (ICTSD) Issue Paper No. 15, 2006),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf.
50. See Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism,
Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, “Global” Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 463 (1998) (“In turn, this [ratcheting] up of domestic
standards of intellectual property protection has the potential to change [the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)] into an agreement that
underwrites an international copyright grab by United States intellectual property
industries.”); Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual
Property Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 53, 55 (2004) (describing the “intellectual property ratchet”).
AND
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denounced bilateral agreements that offered less protection than the Berne
Convention.51 By 1928, the Berne Convention had been revised twice, with
the Berlin Revision of 1908 contributing significantly to a unified
codification of international copyright to which most European countries
acceded. During the Paris Conference of 1971, with increased substantive
harmonization of the Berne Convention, the two provisions were merged
into a single provision codified as Article 20.52 It provides,
The Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to
enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such
agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by
the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this
Convention. The provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these
conditions shall remain applicable.53

Some initial observations should be made here. First, the willingness of
states to denounce existing treaty obligations reflects both the moral and
political strength of the negotiated commitments under the Berne
Convention, particularly given the absence of an enforcement mechanism to
secure compliance.54 Second, the success of the Berne Convention
established an intractable momentum toward consolidation of a strong,
harmonized multilateral accord for global copyright protection. I have
pointed out elsewhere that the laments about a “one-way ratchet” for
intellectual property (IP) rights that have followed the conclusion of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) are not only belated, but also underestimate the deliberate
architecture of international copyright. The fact is that the legal design of
the Berne Convention purposefully exerts a maximalist force over
multilateral copyright regulation55 by, in effect, defining legitimate treaty
activities in the copyright realm as only those that unambiguously enhance
the rights of authors and owners.
It is important to examine more closely the full import of Article 20. In
addition to requiring that “special agreements” do not offer less protection
than the minimum established by the Berne Convention, this provision may
also impose significant limitations on a state’s ability to negotiate treaties
over issues not addressed within the Berne Convention. Professor Sam
Ricketson has opined that, under Article 20, the right to make or maintain
“special agreements” depends upon a threshold assessment of whether the
Thus,
agreement contravenes the provisions of the convention.56
agreements dealing with matters ancillary to copyright, such as the
51. See RICKETSON, supra note 45, at 683–84.
52. Id.
53. Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 20.
54. Although disputes could be brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the compulsory jurisdiction of the court was resisted by many countries. Accordingly,
during the Stockholm Revisions, a new provision making jurisdiction of the court optional
was added to the Berne Convention. See id. art. 33.
55. See Okediji, supra note 49, at 4–9.
56. See RICKETSON, supra note 45, at 685–89.
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regulation of collecting societies, addressing new subject matter for
copyright protection, or a protocol on limitations and exceptions, are all
arguably subject to the scrutiny of Article 20.57 Indeed, even the act of
negotiating an agreement inconsistent with Article 20 could arguably be a
violation of the Berne Convention,58 as would agreements between
members to suspend the operation of the Berne Convention between
them,59 and agreements to modify the obligations of the Berne Convention,
or in other ways end run the level of protection afforded under its terms.60
The result, at least in theory, is that the rights and obligations of the Berne
Convention cannot be constricted by mutual agreement between member
states or by the operation of international law under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).61
This view of Article 20, if persuasive, would suggest that, in addition to
its substantive minima, the Berne Convention also exerts an implicit
jurisdictional authority over subject matter that lies beyond the bounds of
traditional copyright as reflected in the WIPO Internet Treaties. Thus,
notwithstanding the ameliorative outcome of the negotiations,62 it could be
argued that the treaties can only be viewed as strengthening existing global
rights for owners. Even an interpretation maintaining the international
status quo would be suspect, although the Agreed Statements to the treaties
should effectively counter such an argument. Nevertheless, the ritualistic
invocation of Article 20 reflects a long-standing pathological exclusion of
copyright (and IP generally) from general principles of public international
law. Simply put, the constraints of Article 20 are unnecessary in light of
obligations under the Vienna Convention, which has mechanisms designed
to (1) ensure that states adhere to existing treaty obligations63 and (2) deal
with conflicting treaty obligations.64 By maintaining Article 20, even if just
formally, as the sole authorizing premise for presumptively Berneconsistent copyright agreements, whether or not WIPO-originated, and by
further extending its reach to paracopyright subjects, the WIPO Internet
Treaties do not go far enough to offer an opportunity to evaluate the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 687.
60. Id. at 685–89.
61. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(3)–(4), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (providing that subsequent treaties on the
same subject matter between the same parties prevail over earlier treaties to the extent they
are incompatible); see also RICKETSON, supra note 45, at 687 (“[A]rticle 20 continues to
oblige states not to enter into agreements which modify, rather than extend, protection. . . .
[I]t goes without saying that this prevents parties to the Convention [from] agreeing to
suspend, even temporarily, the operation of the Convention as between themselves. This is
an important point, as the general rule of international law appears to be that parties to a
multilateral treaty may do this, unless such a suspension is prohibited by that treaty. Article
20 is clearly such a prohibition.” (citing Vienna Convention, supra, art. 58; IAN M. SINCLAIR,
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 185 (2d ed. 1984))).
62. See Nimmer, supra note 10, at 1; Samuelson, supra note 10, at 435–36.
63. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, arts. 26–27, 31, 41–46, 54–64.
64. See id. art. 30.
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normative reach of global copyright principles in the digital age and, more
importantly, to assess how the design of the Berne Convention can more
explicitly reflect copyright’s long-standing commitment to various aspects
of the public interest.
II. IN COPYRIGHT’S LINEAGE?: THE NEW RIGHTS OF THE WCT
With the Berne Convention as its starting point, the project of devising a
copyright for the information age was circumscribed by two inalterable
propositions. The first was obvious: the analogue version of copyright had
to be translated into the digital environment.65 But consistent with the
history of copyright’s development, the project had to extend beyond a
technical translation of extant rights to include accommodation of the new
opportunities for use and dissemination of works through digital
networks.66 Notably absent were explicit considerations of what digital
technologies could enable with respect to authorship and how information
communications networks would make possible new modes of authorship
and new genres of creative expression.67 Indeed, other than noting the
“outstanding significance of copyright protection as an incentive for literary
and artistic creation,”68 neither the WCT nor the WPPT reflect the
complexity of creative endeavor in an online environment,69 nor, as
increasingly dynamic uses of social networking sites show, do the
agreements even portend the myriad of ways users interact with and within
digital space.70 Consequently, the framing principles of the two treaties
suggest immediately that the preservation of incentives to create,
represented solely by the right to control uses of a protected work, remained
65. WCT, supra note 2, pmbl., paras. 1, 2.
66. Id. pmbl., paras. 2, 3, 5.
67. See Michael Cieply, Show Series to Originate on MySpace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2007, at C1 (referring to an Internet site designed to encourage fans’ creative work); John
Markoff, Mashups Are Breaking the Mold at Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at BU4.
68. WCT, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 4.
69. See Panel III: Fair Use: Its Application, Limitations and Future, 17 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1039–40 (2007) (“Likewise, people are sharing and
creating together, Wikipedia being the clearest example of this. Wiki as a productivity tool
of digital natives is well known. And then, lots of people re-aggregating other people’s
content, so finding what is the best of the digital natives’ content that they have created in
the Web 2.0 space and then re-aggregating it.” (footnote omitted) (remarks of John G.
Palfrey Jr., Executive Director, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law
School)); see also Lisa Veasman, Note, “Piggy Backing” on the Web 2.0 Internet:
Copyright Liability and Web 2.0 Mashups, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 314–15
(2008).
70. See Maria Aspan, Promotion Is Not Just Another Brick in the Wall, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2007, at C5 (“‘Social networking has spawned a lot of people creating personal content’
. . . .” (quoting Ann Lewnes, Senior Vice President for Corporate Marketing and
Communications, Adobe Systems Inc.)); Julie Bosman, Agencies Are Watching as Ads Go
Online, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at C6 (describing user-generated advertisements, using
some copyrighted material); Scott Kirsner, All the World’s a Stage (That Includes the
Internet), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at C7 (describing how amateurs are gradually getting
paid for creative work on the Internet); Noah Robischon, Little Films on Little Screens (But
Both Seem Set to Grow), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, at AR11.
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the core justification and focus of the new digital regime. This focus
greatly impoverished the WIPO Internet Treaties by justifying their
relevance in terms that vastly underestimated the versatility of the digital
environment and the implausibility of excluding consumers, qua users, as
part of the global copyright bargain.
With respect to the WCT, Article 1 formally establishes its status as a
“special agreement” within the meaning of Article 20 of the Berne
Convention.71 Article 1 retains the distinctiveness of the Berne regime72
and, unlike the Berne Convention itself, does not provide a formal link to
other copyright conventions.73 However, Article 1’s invocation of the Paris
Act as the relevant Berne Convention text to which the treaty is to be
applied and the inexplicable obligation to comply with the Berne
Appendix,74 strongly indicate a conscious attempt by the negotiators to
ensure coordination and continuity between the WCT and the TRIPS

71. See WCT, supra note 2, art. 1(1) (“This Treaty is a special agreement within the
meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, as regards Contracting Parties that are countries of the Union established by that
Convention.”).
72. See id. (“This Treaty shall not have any connection with treaties other than the Berne
Convention, nor shall it prejudice any rights and obligations under any other treaties.”); id.
art. 1(2) (“Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing obligations that Contracting
Parties have to each other under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works.”).
73. Compare WCT, supra note 2, art. 1, with Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 20.
For analysis of the relationship of the Berne Convention to the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), see Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, 3
J.L. & TECH. 71, 75–76 (1988); Kelsey Martin Mott, The Relationship Between the Berne
Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention: Historical Background and
Development of Article XVII of the U.C.C. and Its Appendix Declaration, 11 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 306, 307 (1967). TRIPS has rendered the UCC
largely irrelevant. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property:
Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System,
7 SINGAPORE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 333 (2003) (“Despite the United States’ recent
rejoining of [the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)], and the formal persistence of the UCC as an instrument of international law,
the incorporation of substantive provisions of the Berne Convention into the TRIPS
Agreement has, for all intents and purposes, relegated the UCC to the periphery of
international copyright protection.” (citing Sean D. Murphy, United States’ Return to
UNESCO, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 977 (2003)).
74. See Mihály Ficsor, The WIPO “Internet Treaties”: The United States as the Driver:
The United States as the Main Source of Obstruction—As Seen by an Anti-revolutionary
Central European, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 17, 32 (2006) (“The options
offered in the Appendix to the Berne Convention are out-of-date in the era of more perfect
and efficient forms of reprographic reproduction and the widespread use of digital
technology and the Internet.”); see also WIPO, Report on the Online Forum on Intellectual
Property in the Information Society, June 1–15, 2005, at 25, WIPO Doc. WIPO/CRRS/INF/1
(Sept. 19, 2005) (“Copyright-protected content can also be made available under certain
exceptions and limitations to rights in national laws and, in limited circumstances under the
Appendix to the Berne Convention, under compulsory licensing of certain rights.”). For a
more detailed analysis of the appendix’s provisions, see Salah Basalamah, Compulsory
Licensing for Translation: An Instrument of Development?, 40 IDEA 503, 511–22 (2000).
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Agreement.75 Technically, such coordination should not extend the reach
of TRIPS’ interpretations to the WCT; however, the commonality of subject
matter and close proximity of the negotiations certainly raise a compelling
argument for ensuring consistency between the obligations required by the
two agreements.76 Indeed, part of the WCT’s goal is to provide clarity to
Berne Convention obligations;77 accordingly, even if a WCT provision
cannot be formally invoked for enforcement before a World Trade
Organization (WTO) TRIPS dispute panel, it is certainly the case under
international law that WCT provisions can and will provide sources of
interpretation to TRIPS obligations.78 This point is particularly applicable
to those Berne Convention provisions that have been directly incorporated
into the WCT.79
In regards to clarifying existing Berne Convention rules, Articles 2, 4,
and 5 of the WCT affirm several key principles of copyright law in the
international sphere. Most notable is the idea/expression dichotomy,80
which, although recognized in most jurisdictions,81 had not been an explicit
provision in the Berne Convention.82 Similarly, the treatment of computer
programs as literary works83 and the protection of original databases84 were
75. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 9(1),
10(1), 14(3), 14(6), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
76. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61, arts. 30, 31(3); WIPO, The Advantages of
Adherence to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), at 8–9 (Dec. 20, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO, Advantages of
Adherence],
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/es/activities/wct_wppt/pdf/
advantages_wct_wppt.pdf (“The WCT and WPPT each contain several provisions that
impose obligations derived from, and similar to, those in the TRIPS Agreement . . . . The
WCT and WPPT serve to update the TRIPS obligations, creating a modern and
comprehensive framework of rights for the digital age.”).
77. WCT, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 2 (“Recognizing the need to introduce new
international rules and clarify the interpretation of certain existing rules . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 61, arts. 30, 31(3). For a fuller analysis of
the relationship between the WCT and the TRIPS Agreement, see generally WIPO,
Implications of the TRIPS Agreement on Treaties Administered by WIPO, at 164, WIPO
Publ’n No. 464(E) (1996); Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 441 (1997).
79. See WCT, supra note 2, art. 3 (incorporating Articles 2 through 6 of the Berne
Convention directly).
80. See id. art. 2 (setting forth the scope of copyright protection). The idea/expression
dichotomy was first explicitly incorporated in the international copyright system in the
TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 75, art. 9(2).
81. J. A. L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 221 & n.10 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that
while the idea/expression dichotomy is distinctly a U.S. doctrine and not explicitly
incorporated in the laws of major European countries, it has influenced judicial decisions in
those countries).
82. Instead, the convention had articulated a definition of “literary and artistic works”
and restricted protection for factual works, which together effectively accomplished the
delimiting purpose of the idea/expression dichotomy. See Berne Convention, supra note 14,
art. 2.
83. See WCT, supra note 2, art. 4.
84. See id. art. 5.
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explicitly incorporated into the WCT as already recognized in the TRIPS
Agreement.85 By and large, these acknowledgments of rights that already
existed as a form of international common law do not portend significant
shifts in the digital context.86 In terms of new rights to reflect the impact of
digital technologies on the fundamental economics of copyright’s core right
of reproduction, the WCT recognizes an exclusive right of “making
available to the public” originals or copies of works through sales or other
means.87 It also recognizes the exclusive right of authors of computer
programs, cinematographic works, and works embodied in phonograms to
authorize commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of their
works.88 For these new rights, the term “copies” means only “copies that
can be put into circulation as tangible objects” to ensure that transient
reproductions, such as those automatically generated by computers in
Random Access Memory (RAM) modules, are not swept under the ambit of
these provisions.89
The WCT also established an exclusive right of communication to the
public. Contained in Article 8, the right of communication to the public
covers both print and digital works and includes language that constrains
the means and ends of user access to protected works. Owners have the
exclusive right to make their works available to the public “in such a way
that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a
time individually chosen by them.”90 The strong presence of Internet
Service Providers (ISPs), Online Service Providers (OSPs), and
representatives of the telecommunications industry during the WIPO
negotiations91 ensured that merely providing technologies or a physical
place to access digital content would not run afoul of the new right.92
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that this tenuous compromise
between content and service providers did not resolve the question of whose
85. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 75, art. 10.
86. Indeed, the Agreed Statements to Articles 4 and 5 make clear that the WCT is
consistent with sister provisions in the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. See
WCT, supra note 2, art. 4 n.3, art. 5 n.4.
87. See id. art. 6.
88. See id. art. 7.
89. See id. art.6 n.5 (Agreed Statements concerning arts. 6–7).
90. See id. art. 8.
91. See Ficsor, supra note 74, at 22 (discussing coalition building during negotiations on
the WIPO Internet Treaties and highlighting the important role “telecommunication
companies, Internet service providers, other information technology industries,
entertainment equipment, and recording material manufacturers” played in the successful
conclusion of the treaties); Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown
Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1058 (2007) (“By the end of the multilateral negotiations held at
Geneva in 1996, the intense struggle among stakeholders representing content providers, the
telecommunications industry, online service providers, and the educational and scientific
communities produced a workable compromise in the WCT.”).
92. See WCT, supra note 2, art. 8 n.8. During the WCT negotiations, a strong consensus
emerged against strict liability for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for copyright
infringement. See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 382–92 (discussing the WIPO negotiations
on ISP liability).
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presumptive privileges—owners’ or users’—should prevail in controlling
public engagement with digital content and, more importantly, who should
bear the brunt of controlling unauthorized access and use.93 Despite the
basic principle established by WCT Article 8, content providers in Europe
have sought tirelessly to direct legislative attention and efforts to mandate
greater action by service providers to control users’ online activities,94
while the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)95 in the United States
provides a calibrated process or “dance” in which content owners and ISPs
play a role in addressing violations of copyright rights.96 Weary legislators
recently appear to see the inefficacy of new laws, instead highlighting the
desirability of privately negotiated industry agreements.97 The claim that
“both the WCT and WPPT address the challenges posed by today’s digital
technologies, in particular the dissemination of protected material over
digital networks such as the Internet,”98 now seems quite hollow in light of
the increasing complexity of claims arising from new uses, new users, and
new works.
Several recent decisions in the United States addressing the right of
distribution highlight the marginal role of the WCT in defining user
interests in the face of the traditional copyright balance. In Capital
Records, Inc. v. Thomas,99 for example, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota considered the issue of whether making sound
recordings available for distribution on a peer-to-peer network qualifies as
“distribution” under the 1976 Copyright Act. Rejecting the plaintiffs’
claim, the court held that actual dissemination of copyrighted works, rather
than making them available for dissemination through a file-sharing
93. See Doreen Carvajal, Net Firms as the New Cybercops?: Critics Wary of Errant
Online Users, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Apr. 14, 2008, at 1.
94. See, e.g., U.K. Urged to Follow France Lead on Piracy, INT’L HERALD TRIB.
(London), Feb. 13, 2008, at 13.
95. WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
17, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
96. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006); see also Reichman et al., supra note 91, at 989–94
(describing the legislative history of the DMCA ISP safe-harbors and concluding that they
have “generally been efficacious in run-of-the-mill copyright infringement cases involving
users and their ISPs” (citing Heidi Pearlman Salow, Liability Immunity for Internet Service
Providers—How Is It Working?, 6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 31, 49–50 (2001); Christian C. M.
Beams, Note, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service Providers: Problem
Solved . . . for Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 846 (1999))).
97. See, e.g., Nikki Tait, EU to Rule Out New Piracy Laws, FIN. TIMES (London), May
13, 2008, at 5; Dugie Standeford, EU Internal Market Chief: Counterfeiting and Piracy
Need Industry-Led Solutions, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, May 14, 2008, http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2008/05/14/eu-internal-market-chief-counterfeiting-and-piracy-needindustry-led-solutions/.
98. See WIPO Permanent Comm. on Cooperation for Dev. Related to Intellectual Prop.,
The Digital Agenda: Implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), at 2, WIPO Doc. PCIPD/3/9 (July 2002)
[hereinafter WIPO, The Digital Agenda], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/
mdocs/en/pcipd_3/pcipd_3_9.pdf.
99. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
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application, is required to establish the infringement of the distribution right
under U.S. law. Utilizing Articles 6(1) and 8 of the WCT and Articles
12(1) and 14 of the WPPT, the plaintiffs argued that the provisions of the
Copyright Act should be interpreted in light of the United States’
international treaty obligations and therefore should be held to incorporate
an exclusive making-available right.100 Refusing to follow this reasoning,
the court noted that since the WIPO Internet Treaties are not self-executing,
“the fact that [they] protect a making-available right does not create an
enforceable making-available right” under U.S. law.101 Rather, according
to the court, “the contents of the WIPO treaties are only relevant insofar as
[a provision of the Copyright Act] is ambiguous and there is a reasonable
interpretation . . . that aligns with the United States’ treaty obligations.”102
Similarly, in Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Barker,103 the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the plaintiffs’
call for recognition of a making-available right as “not grounded” in the
provisions of the Copyright Act.104 As in Thomas, the court distinguished
the construction of the distribution right in the digital context and refused to
follow the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,105 which
recognized an enforceable making-available right in the offline
environment.106 Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that the provisions of the WIPO Internet Treaties should control the
interpretation of the U.S. Copyright Act, noting that the treaties “create no
private right of action on their own.”107
As another indication of recent attempts by courts to recalibrate the
presumptions that underlie the use of content in the online environment, the
court in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.108 held that the DMCA requires a
content owner to have a good faith belief that the use of content is not fair
use. The plaintiff argued that fair use is a user’s right protected by the
Copyright Act, a privilege that the defendants reframed as merely a
defense.109 The court ruled that “[t]he purpose of [the DMCA] is to prevent
the abuse of takedown notices,” and “[a] good faith consideration of
whether a particular use is fair use is consistent with the purpose of the
100. Id. at 1225–26.
101. Id. at 1226.
102. Id.
103. 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
104. Id. at 243.
105. 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
106. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 243–44 (citing Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 201); see also
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166–69 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding
that infringement of the right to distribute requires the actual dissemination of copyrighted
works); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802–05 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(noting that to establish a violation of the distribution right, the plaintiff must show proof of
either actual dissemination of a copyrighted work or an offer to distribute).
107. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 242 n.7.
108. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
109. Id. at 1154.
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statute.”110 Further, the court observed that “[r]equiring owners to consider
fair use will help ‘ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to
improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will
expand’ without compromising ‘the movies, music, software and literary
works that are the fruit of American creative genius.’”111
As these cases illustrate, the challenge of digital content ownership is
aggravated by the proliferation of consumer technologies and social
networking sites, which routinely enable repeated access to and use of
digital content such that consumers hardly expect interference with their
ability to control, access, and manage an array of works created, shifted,
and shared across a versatile set of personal, portable technologies. It is not
merely the easy availability of content-laden consumer goods that propels
an assumption among users that access, use, and sharing are the prevailing
norms of the digital environment but, more significantly, the fact that the
social (and increasingly economic) currency of the digital age is explicitly
dependent on the network features that characterize most new technologies.
So powerful is the salience of interactive platforms as prototypical of the
digital age that even the recent struggle over a single platform for highdefinition videos must, at least in part, be understood as implicitly rooted in
the compulsion to create technologies that allow users to employ existing
content and leverage it across multiple contexts.112
Despite the express effort to use the WIPO Internet Treaties to “gap fill”
the Berne Convention (which did not contain an exclusive right of
communication to the public),113 the indomitable role of users in enhancing
the value of the online world through content creation has in fact produced
various efforts to mediate a private compromise between content owners
and ISPs/OSPs. The most salient example is the recent collaboration
between leading media and content providers that produced a set of
guidelines dealing with so-called User Generated Content (UGC).114 In
addition to legislative fatigue, the orientation toward privately negotiated
norms to govern the iterative process of creativity in the online world
reflects the futility of treating users as external to the creative enterprise,
and opens up the possibility of entrenching access principles as a
constituent part of the economic models that drive copyright regulation.115
110. Id. at 1156.
111. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998)).
112. Marc Saltzman, New Features Coming for Blu-ray Format: High-def DVD Players
Go to the Next Level with Interactive Net Access, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2008, at 4B
(describing various new features on Blu-ray machines that allow users to share audio or
video content).
113. See WIPO HANDBOOK, supra note 13, §§ 5.223, 5.225, at 271–72.
114. See User Generated Content Principles, Principles for User Generated Content
Services:
Foster Innovation.
Encourage Creativity.
Thwart Infringement.,
www.ugcprinciples.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
115. In line with this point, a recent study estimated that, as of 2006, companies
benefiting from fair use represented one-sixth of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). See
THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, CAPITAL TRADE, INC., FAIR USE IN THE U.S.
ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 6 (2007).
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In this regard, the WIPO Internet Treaties remain imprecise and thus largely
irrelevant to the dominant copyright questions facing acceding states today.
In obligating states to enhance protection for content providers, but failing
to presage the vital role of users in the creative process, the treaties opened
up a significant unregulated space in which the major actors—content
providers and ISPs—must contend for the creative surplus of the public at
large that will help determine the extent of the economic value derived from
new technologies.116
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the new WCT rights
significantly added to the portfolio of claims held by copyright owners.
Arguably, existing Berne Convention rights such as the right of
reproduction and the right of distribution could have been used to address
concerns about granting copyright owners the authority to determine how
and when their works could be accessed and used in the online
environment.117 There certainly is no question that the driving principle of
the WCT was to give authors the right to control access to and use of their
works on digital networks.118 However, the new rights were in some ways
prematurely recognized given the lack of agreement among states as to the
specific form of the right to control digital transmissions and public access
to protected works.119 Today, even within the European Union, a consistent
approach to the WCT rights has been frustrated by the failure to
acknowledge the role of access rights in construing the precise acts for
which a user might have violated the author’s legitimate entitlement.120
Similarly, in the United States, as noted earlier, several federal district
courts have rejected rights holders’ requests for relief and ruled that
“making available to the public” is not a right recognized under U.S.
copyright law.121

116. See Andrew M. Ballard, Transparency, Trust Said Needed to Develop Effective
Marketplace for IP, 75 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 447 (2008); see also Austin
Modine, YouTube Blocks Music Videos in UK, REGISTER, Mar. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/03/09/youtube_blocks_music_vids_in_uk/ (describing the
recent dispute between YouTube and the U.K. Performing Rights Society, which resulted in
the blocking of most YouTube music videos from U.K. viewers); Tim Arango, Rights Clash
on YouTube, and Videos Disappear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU1 (describing a
similar dispute between YouTube and the Time Warner Music Group).
117. See Mihály Ficsor, The Spring 1997 Horace S. Manges Lecture—Copyright for the
Digital Era: The WIPO “Internet” Treaties, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 197, 207–14
(1997) (noting the inherent limitations in such an approach).
118. See WIPO HANDBOOK, supra note 13, §§ 5.222–5.227, at 271–72.
119. See Ficsor, supra note 117, at 207–10.
120. Guido Westkamp, Transient Copying and Public Communications: The Creeping
Evolution of Use and Access Rights in European Copyright Law, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 1057, 1074–79 (2004).
121. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(noting that “[t]he majority of district courts have rejected the . . . ‘making available’ theory
because [it] is inconsistent with the Copyright Act” and holding that merely making a work
available on a peer-to-peer network does not constitute copyright infringement); Elektra
Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Atl. Recording
Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281–82 (D. Conn. 2008) (describing the “making
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The standards ultimately agreed to in the WIPO Internet Treaties leave
open a range of design possibilities at the national level,122 a flexibility that,
while desirable politically, also cuts against the chief benefits of a global
accord on the scope of digital copyright rights. But, in the end, as already
discussed, much of the early debates over the scope and form of the WCT
rights fell short of addressing the fundamental question of how digital
networks and the value that users bring to the table can be harvested to
generate the social and economic value that indispensably fuels the digital
economy.123
III. DISABLING DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
A. Deference and Disharmony
By far, the most significant additions to copyright’s traditional legacy are
the new rights concerning technological measures124 and rights
management information.125 Articles 11 and 12 of the WCT are the
primary examples of new international rights introduced to “provide
adequate solutions to the questions raised by new . . . technological
developments.”126 Article 11 of the WCT expresses the well-known
provision requiring protection for anticircumvention measures used by
copyright owners in conjunction with the exercise of their legitimate rights.
Article 12 is a corollary to this new right, providing for the protection of
rights management information. Both of these provisions have been the
most controversial aspects of the WCT. The U.S. implementation of these
provisions, which adopts an extreme version in the DMCA,127 has been
extended to the multilateral trade environment through a network of Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs), which require countries to ratify the WIPO
Internet Treaties.128 Indeed, in particularly pernicious forms, some FTAs
available” theory as “problematic”); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d
796, 802–05 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (declining to recognize a “making available” theory of
copyright infringement because it is contrary to the weight of authority and “inconsistent
with the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976”); Arista Records, Inc. v.
MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,
2002); see also Steven Seidenberg, International ‘Making Available’ Right Becoming Less
Available in US Law, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, May 28, 2008, http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2008/05/28/international-making-available-right-becoming-less-available-in-us-law/.
122. See generally Urs Gasser, Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of
Digital Content: Moving Forward Towards a Best Practice Model, 17 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 39 (2006).
123. But see Reichman et al., supra note 91 (proposing a “reverse notice and takedown”
scheme to address public interest uses).
124. See WPPT, supra note 3, art. 18; WCT, supra note 2, art. 11.
125. See WPPT, supra note 3, art. 19; WCT, supra note 2, art. 12.
126. See WCT, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 2.
127. See supra note 95.
128. See Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 212–
16 (2006); see also Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement art. 15.5.7, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462 [hereinafter CAFTA-DR], available at
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go as far as to spell out the precise language of obligations, which typically
mirrors the language of the DMCA.129 Since the Berne Convention
authorizes protection stronger than any minimum terms set forth in the
treaty or related special agreements, this globalization of the DMCA is, in
theory, compatible with the Berne framework. However, neither adoption
of the DMCA model nor ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties has
established a global harmonized baseline for technological protection
measures (TPMs) or anticircumvention legislation.130 The WCT thus
accomplished a remarkable feat: a global treaty was negotiated not to
harmonize various national approaches to a particular copyright issue, but
rather to create a framework in which states could choose to live in
disharmony—to provide specific rights within their domestic copyright
laws without any concomitant obligations to attend to the often touted
benefits of harmonization. The WCT goes even further. Beyond
encouraging states to exercise national policy prerogatives in implementing
its obligations, the WCT also contemplates that such implementation can be
accomplished using noncopyright regimes such as unfair competition
laws,131 which are nonexistent in most DCs and LDCs.
B. National Implementation of the WCT/WPPT
In 2003, WIPO conducted a survey of thirty-nine member states that had
acceded to or ratified either or both the WCT and the WPPT prior to April
1, 2003.132 Of the countries surveyed, only Japan and the United States are
considered “developed” countries.133 Today, the WCT has seventy
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/
asset_upload_file934_3935.pdf.
129. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 128, arts. 15.5.7–.8.
130. Gasser, supra note 122, at 65–93 (discussing various design options).
131. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological Measures Protecting
Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience, 29 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 11, 20 & n.40 (2005) (“It is worth noting that the WCT does not require that
protections for technological measures be enacted as part of national copyright laws; that
certainly is one route, but so too are sui generis laws or inclusion of protections within the
scope of more general laws, such as those addressing unfair competition. . . . For example,
Japan has divided coverage of technological measures between the copyright law and the
unfair competition law. Australia has done this solely within the provisions of its 1968
Copyright Act but makes them the subject of separate rights of action that may be brought by
the copyright owner.” (citations omitted)); see also WIPO Standing Comm. on Copyright &
Related Rights, Survey on Implementation Provisions of the WCT and the WPPT, WIPO
Doc. SCCR/9/6 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter WIPO, Implementation Survey], available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_6.pdf (providing an overview
of the methods individual member states have utilized to implement the WIPO Internet
Treaties and highlighting the diversity among them).
132. The countries surveyed were Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon,
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Republic of Moldova, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the
United States. See WIPO, Implementation Survey, supra note 131.
133. See id.
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contracting parties, more than half of which joined the WCT in 2002 and
the majority of which are DCs and LDCs.134 Indeed, if judged solely by the
acceding countries, the WIPO Internet Treaties reflect a drastic change from
the concert of countries that negotiated the Berne Convention over a
century ago. Where the Berne Convention countries were all European
with fairly similar levels of socioeconomic development, the WCT
contracting parties were mainly DCs and LDCs whose combined gross
domestic product (GDP) represents a mere fraction of that of their
developed country counterparts.135
The survey results reflect significant consistency between developed
countries and DCs/LDCs in the implementation of the WIPO Internet
Treaties’ provisions in national laws, including limitations and
exceptions.136 This may quickly be attributed to WIPO’s role in providing
technical assistance in implementing the treaties to the latter group of
countries.
However, national implementation of anticircumvention
measures and the obligation to protect rights management information were
Countries that provided protection against
highly inconsistent.137
anticircumvention did so under a variety of legal means, ranging from
criminal law to unfair competition law.138 In some laws, only acts of
circumvention were prohibited, while preparatory acts or making equipment
available were prohibited in others.139 Similar variations were evident in
the implementation of Article 12 relating to digital rights management
(DRM).140
As mentioned earlier, the variety of implementation models with respect
to Articles 11 and 12 reflects the important flexibility in the global
obligations contained in the WCT141 and an unusual deference to the
134. See WCT Contracting Parties, supra note 4.
135. As revealed by analysis of World Bank data, in 2007, the combined real GDP of
developing countries (DCs) and least-developed countries (LDCs) party to the WCT was
roughly twenty percent of the combined real GDP of developed WCT members. See WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 14–16 (2007).
136. See WIPO, Implementation Survey, supra note 131, at 2–3.
137. See id. at 3; see also Richard Li-Dar Wang, DMCA Anti-circumvention Provisions in
a Different Light: Perspectives from Transnational Observation of Five Jurisdictions, 34
AIPLA Q.J. 217, 219 (2006).
138. Compare, e.g., WIPO, Implementation Survey, supra note 131, at 395–96
(reproducing relevant provisions of the Jamaican Copyright Act employing criminal
sanctions to address anticircumvention), with id. at 438–39 (reproducing relevant provisions
of the Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Law employing unfair competition principles
to address same).
139. Compare, e.g., id. at 902–03 (reproducing relevant provisions of U.S. copyright law
prohibiting only actual circumvention), with id. at 610 (reproducing relevant provisions of
the Paraguayan Copyright Act prohibiting the act of making equipment available).
140. Compare, e.g., id. at 821 (reproducing relevant provisions of the Copyright and
Related Rights Act of Slovenia requiring that Rights Management Information (RMI) be
embodied in a copy of the work), with id. at 199 (reproducing relevant provisions of the
Copyright Act of the Czech Republic not requiring that RMI be embodied in a copy of a
work).
141. Samuelson, supra note 10, at 414–15; Thomas C. Vinje, A Brave New World of
Technical Protection Systems: Will There Still Be Room for Copyright?, 18 EUR. INTELL.
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national design of digital copyright. Despite a standard that could be tilted
solely in favor of owners, national laws in developed countries can and
have implemented these obligations in ways that reflect deliberate policy
choices and nuances that calibrate a variety of domestic interests at stake.142
The core principle of anticircumvention, for example, designed to secure
the economic interests (primarily) of owners, should yield not only to the
reality of coordinated technologies that conform to modern lifestyles, but
also to changed expectations of users about what such technology
presumptively entitles them to do.143
Without question, U.S. implementation of the anticircumvention and
DRM obligations144 has engendered significant controversy both
domestically and globally,145 and important attention has been directed at
the negative effects of the DMCA in the domestic U.S. market. The impact
of TPMs on access to digital content has also been noted by WIPO as being
of great concern to DCs and LDCs.146 As I explore briefly in the following
section, the extent of these concerns is important because, in the current
global economic context, these countries have little to gain from the WIPO
Internet Treaties and, by many accounts, have much to lose by the design
choices made during domestic implementation of the treaties in developed
countries. Importantly (or perhaps ironically), DCs and LDCs, who
typically agitate for less substantive harmonization and greater domestic
flexibility in IP matters, have now received it in an area in which the
exercise of such flexibility has little meaning for development policy goals.
PROP. REV. 431, 431–32 (1996) (noting differences between the WCT and U.S
implementation of its provisions).
142. Gasser, supra note 122, at 66–93; Wang, supra note 137, at 230–35 (comparing
scope of protection of anticircumvention provisions in Japan, Australia, the European Union,
and the United States).
143. See WIPO, Technological Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology,
Law and Commercial Licenses, at 4, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/3 (Dec. 3, 1999)
(prepared by Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull), available at http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/wct_wppt_imp/wct_wppt_imp_3.pdf.
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
145. See, e.g., June M. Besek, Anti-circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from
the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 467-69
(2004); David Nimmer, Back from the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 867 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-circumvention Regulations Need to Be
Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 534–37 (1999). See also generally Ian Brown, The
Evolution of Anti-circumvention Law, 20 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 239 (2006).
146. See WIPO General Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the
Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, at 3, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11 (Aug.
27, 2004) [hereinafter WIPO, Development Agenda Proposal], available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ga_31/wo_ga_31_11.pdf (“The ongoing
controversy surrounding the use of technological protection measures in the digital
environment is also of great concern. The provisions of any treaties in this field must be
balanced and clearly take on board the interests of consumers and the public at large. It is
important to safeguard the exceptions and limitations existing in the domestic laws of
Member States. In order to tap into the development potential offered by the digital
environment, it is important to bear in mind the relevance of open access models for the
promotion of innovation and creativity.”).
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C. Participation by Developing and Least-Developed Countries in the
WCT and WPPT Framework
With China’s accession to the WCT on March 9, 2007,147 the vast
majority of the world’s population has become subject to the digital
copyright regime. Despite its application to a global audience whose
citizens live well below the global poverty level, the stark reality is that
digital copyright has yet to fully impact most citizens of DCs and LDCs.
The premature ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties is thus troubling
where these regions are concerned. Over 18% of the countries that ratified
the WCT are in Africa.148 Africa is estimated to hold 14.2% of the world’s
population,149 but only 5.6% of the population has access to the Internet.150
Asia represents 60.5% of the world’s population,151 but only 17.2% of the
population has Internet access.152 In Latin America and the Caribbean,
which comprise 8.6% of the world’s population,153 only 28.6% of the
population has Internet access.154 For all practical purposes, then, the vast
majority of the population in these countries cannot make any significant
use of digital works, and, arguably, the WIPO Internet Treaties are even
less relevant to these countries than traditional copyright agreements.
If, as I argued earlier, the treaties do not enhance incentives for creativity
in general, and if infrastructure needs render them mostly immaterial for
most of the world’s population, in what ways have copyright goals been
meaningfully advanced either for users or owners anywhere by the
proliferation of digital copyright obligations? More importantly, why was it
important for DCs and LDCs to ratify the treaties?155 Since the entry into
force of both treaties, not a single DC or LDC has had reason to experiment
with their provisions domestically, nor have the domestic laws
implementing the treaties ever been invoked before a domestic court. This
observation of limited national experience is certainly not limited to the
WIPO Internet Treaties, but it does point to the extreme improbability that
DCs and LDCs can exercise effective design choices at the national level.
Even if so, there is a question whether such investments can be justified in
the absence of sophisticated institutions to develop and sustain a publicinterest balance in the deployment of TPMs locally. Nevertheless, three

147. See WIPO, WCT Notification No. 66, WIPO Copyright Treaty: Accession by the
People’s Republic of China (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/wct/
treaty_wct_66.html. The WCT entered into force in China on June 9, 2007. Id.
148. See WCT Contracting Parties, supra note 4.
149. See POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 2007 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET 7
(2007), available at http://www.prb.org/pdf07/07WPDS_Eng.pdf.
150. See Internet World Stats, World Internet Usage Statistics News and World
Population Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
151. See POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 149, at 8.
152. See Internet World Stats, supra note 150.
153. See POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 149, at 8.
154. See Internet World Stats, supra note 150.
155. See Tracking Pirates in Cyberspace, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 73, 76 (2004)
(remarks of Peter Harter, Managing Principal, The Farrington Group).
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main reasons can be identified for extending the WIPO Internet Treaties to
the Southern Hemisphere.
1. As It Was in the Beginning: The Importance of Making Good on
Claimed Benefits
Assimilating DCs and LDCs into the global copyright system is a
familiar component of the path dependency characteristic of global
copyright lawmaking. Since the Stockholm Protocol, which first formally
acknowledged special needs of DCs,156 no other revision of the Berne
Convention or associated special treaty has purposively sought to identify
the impact of new provisions on the development needs and aspirations of
the global South beyond general statements regarding the “balance”
evidenced by the formal language of the treaties.157 Instead, the
justifications for “globalizing copyright” have sought to impute benefits
deeply linked to and dependent on the existence of capital markets and
institutional actors to copyright regulation in the impoverished and unstable
economies of much of the Southern Hemisphere. In the context of the
WIPO Internet Treaties, DC and LDC participation has been specifically
justified in ways that echo disputed, untested, and at times inapplicable (but
as yet historically pervasive) rationalizations for the internationalization of
IP more generally. These include, most notably, benefits of technology
transfer, foreign direct investment, stimulation of domestic creativity and
innovation, and general development progress. However, none of these
claims have been proven in the experience of most DCs and LDCs, and
there is some consensus that the relationship between IP and development is
much more complex than the claims suggest. Indeed, it is instructive to
compare official justifications for DC and LDC participation in the WIPO
Internet Treaties with concerns articulated by these countries in the proposal
for a WIPO Development Agenda. With respect to the possibility of
foreign technology transfers, the proposal states,
The transfer of technology has been identified as an objective that
intellectual property protection should be supportive of and not run
counter to, as stated in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. Yet,
156. See RICKETSON, supra note 45, at 593–623.
157. References to “balance” and “flexibilities” have recently become a staple part of IP
lingua franca, including within WIPO, which has historically emphasized the benefits of IP
protection for development. See, e.g., WIPO Standing Comm. on Copyright & Related
Rights, WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Digital Environment, WIPO Doc. SCCR/9/7 (Apr. 5, 2003) (prepared by Sam Ricketson),
available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_9/sccr_9_7.pdf.
But
formal statements alone cannot alleviate the burden of IP enforcement in DCs and LDCs, nor
alter the troubling practice of offering technical assistance to these countries primarily for
enforcing rights, not limitations and exceptions—which are the mechanisms of the so-called
balance reflected in the treaties. See, e.g., WIPO Permanent Comm. on Cooperation for Dev.
Related to Intellectual Prop., WIPO’s Legal and Technical Assistance to Developing
Countries for the Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement from January 1, 1996, to June 30,
2000, WIPO Doc. WIPO/TRIPS/2000/1 (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/
meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=33295.
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many of the developing countries and LDCs that have taken up higher IP
obligations in recent years simply lack the necessary infrastructure and
institutional capacity to absorb such technology.
Even in developing countries that may have a degree of absorptive
technological capacity, higher standards of intellectual property protection
have failed to foster the transfer of technology through foreign direct
investment and licensing. In effect, corrective measures are needed to
address the inability of existing IP agreements and treaties to promote a
real transfer of technology to developing countries and LDCs.158

Yet, according to a WIPO document outlining the advantages of
adherence to the WCT and WPPT,159 digital copyright protection
will encourage investment in the country, both domestic and foreign, by
providing greater certainty to businesses that their property can be safely
disseminated there.
....
The level of intellectual property protection and enforcement is very
much a factor in industry’s decisions to invest in any particular country.
Companies evaluate the likelihood that they will sell enough legitimate
copies of the products—in light of local intellectual property protection.
It does not make sense for investors to put money into a market where
they will not recover their investment and generate a reasonable profit.
For copyrighted products, this depends almost entirely on the level of
copyright protection. Adherence to the treaties makes a strong statement
of the country’s commitment to copyright protection and readiness to
respond to technological change.160

Another stated advantage of the WIPO Internet Treaties includes the
protection in developed countries of works by local creators and enterprises
from DCs and LDCs, which ensures “that [these] creators and enterprises
enjoy the economic rewards from outside the country.”161 Yet, recently, a
major Indian filmmaker noted the failure of U.S. authorities to crack down
on U.S. sales of home videos of movies made in India.162 Indeed, it is
hardly likely that enforcement of foreign rights in developed countries
represents any meaningful concern for authorities in those countries.163
Further, claims that “jobs all over the world” are created by copyright
industries, “not just for developed countries, but also for developing
countries and for many related economic sectors that contribute to
158. WIPO, Development Agenda Proposal, supra note 146, Annex, at 3.
159. See generally WIPO, Advantages of Adherence, supra note 76.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id. at 4.
162. See Tony Dutra, Indian Film Maker Faults Failure to Address Counterfeit Movie
Sales in U.S., 75 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 680, 680–81 (2008).
163. Id. at 681 (noting Indian film producer’s hopes that cooperation between the Indian
film industry and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) could help address
the issue of enforcement of foreign rights in the United States).
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manufacturing, sales and service of these products”164 simply are not borne
out by existing empirical evidence or the conclusions of leading
economists.165 Neither is the claim that copyright industries can make
significant contributions to the economies of developing countries. In
short, other than the enactment of implementing legislation, there is no
evidence of local engagement with the WIPO Internet Treaties in DCs and
LDCs, much less any evidence to verify these assertions.
Even with respect to benefits that might inure to developed countries,
such as the enhancement of technology markets and e-commerce, the stated
official justifications are simply facile. Technology markets in IP have
been stymied for a variety of reasons that include a reliance on the right to
exclude use as a dominant model.166 In Europe, where considerable
substantive harmonization has occurred since the 1990s, there remain
considerable challenges to the development of a robust internal market for
online works.167
2. The Accountability Deficit
Claims that strong protection for IP will ineluctably produce positive
development gains in the global South systematically underestimate and
undervalue the importance of access to knowledge and technology as part
of a necessary global bargain to facilitate consumer creativity and
contribute to development aspirations. Similarly, resting the development
challenge solely at the feet of a flawed global IP system falls far short of
confronting the significant infrastructural shortcomings of many DCs and
LDCs, which makes harnessing IP rights (balanced or not) for development
164. WIPO, The Digital Agenda, supra note 98, at 5; see also WIPO, Advantages of
Adherence, supra note 76, at 6.
165. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on
Investment, Technology Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107, 122–24 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al.
eds., 1993); Keith E. Maskus & Denise Eby Konan, Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights: Issues and Exploratory Results, in ANALYTICAL AND NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE
GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 401, 414–15 (Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 1994).
See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(2000).
166. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (discussing the difficulties antitrust regulators face in technology
markets due “to the uncertain fit between the market conditions that produce innovation and
the market conditions to which antitrust policy generally aspires, and, in part, to uncertainty
about how innovation might affect market structure and performance”); Keith E. Maskus,
Using the International Trading System to Foster Technology Transfer for Economic
Development, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 219, 234–35 (noting that a principal factor inhibiting
international technology-transfer markets is market power of owners of technical
information rooted in, among other things, the exercise of IP rights); Kathryn McMahon,
Interoperability: “Indispensability” and “Special Responsibility” in High Technology
Markets, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123, 171 (2007) (discussing the detrimental effects
of “abusive and exclusionary conduct” in high technology markets); see also Ballard, supra
note 116, at 448.
167. See generally Tilman Lüder, The Next Ten Years in E.U. Copyright: Making
Markets Work, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2007).
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a truly difficult task. Nevertheless, the fact that DCs and LDCs are
somehow successfully persuaded to ratify major IP treaties suggests that
there is some capacity at the global institutional level to influence the
direction of IP regulation in the global South. Arguments presented
systematically by private actors, developed countries, and even WIPO168
that new rights and regimes offer development benefits to DCs and LDCs
require regulatory space to address, on a global front, the access needs that
are most relevant to leveraging technology for development gains in areas
ranging from bulk access to educational materials to distance learning.169
There should be corresponding accountability by WIPO and developed
countries for the negative effects of heightened copyright standards and,
importantly, attention directed at redressing the lack of corresponding
minimum limitations and exceptions in the global copyright scheme that
now includes the WIPO Internet Treaties. This lack of accountability for
the claims that, when leveraged, have historically encouraged DC and LDC
ratification of IP treaties, have contributed to a political and institutional
global culture in which the needs of DCs and LDCs are often framed as
illegitimate attempts to undermine the economic value of IP rights. If such
value is not dispersed among all signatory countries, there can be nothing
illegitimate about demands that the system be examined to determine its
impact on the aspirations of the majority of treaty members.
3. Considerations of Private Enforcement
To the extent consumers in the global South are far less vulnerable to the
enforcement processes of developed countries, the legitimacy and efficacy
of technological controls become far more important to content providers
whose reliance on private enforcement will likely be far greater across
territorial lines. Ratification of the WIPO Internet Treaties by DCs and
LDCs was thus important not necessarily to obligate these countries to new
copyright standards as such, but, instead, as a means for content providers
to circumvent reliance on domestic institutions in those countries in
enforcing their rights—whether or not such rights are consistent with the
domestic choices of treaty implementation.
Put differently, the
technological protection controls legitimized in the WIPO Internet Treaties
not only trivialize the possibility that users in the global South might
actually engender value in the global networks, but could also render the
dominance of national copyright laws a nullity.

168. See Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen & William New, WIPO Copyright Advice Deemed
Misleading to Developing Countries, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/index.php?p=221.
169. Id.; see also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “From Below”: Copyright and
Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 840–42 (2007).
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D. The Importance of Accounting for the Future
As with the developed countries, the WIPO Internet Treaties
simultaneously offer too little for users in DCs and LDCs. The sheer
populational advantage of the global South is increasingly being leveraged
by the new models of interaction, entrepreneurship, and creativity that
pervade the digital realm.170 Over 80% of estimated Internet users live
outside of the United States and 50% of the online advertising market is
also non-U.S.171 Between 2006 and 2007, use of social networking sites in
the Middle East and Africa increased by almost 70%, and in Asia Pacific by
50%.172 In international fora, demands by DCs and LDCs that global
copyright regulation must reflect and be accountable to broader economic
and social goals have engendered new action programs and initiatives,173
while an active and engaged civil society network steadfastly resists the
unfettered expansion of IP rights more generally.
The tendency of global copyright regulation to marginalize the publicinterest priorities that make copyright law both necessary and relevant is
evident in the compromises that yielded the WIPO Internet Treaties. After
more than a decade, neither developed countries nor DCs/LDCs appear to
have benefited uniquely from the hard-fought battle over the appropriate
role of copyright in the digital age; instead, there appears to be only
increasing regulatory space for private lawmaking to occur174 as the best
means to appropriate copyright’s goals within the contested arena of global
digital networks. This might suggest that the real danger of the WIPO
Internet Treaties is not that they strengthen private copyright interests, but
that they make public copyright regulation less meaningful. At best, it
would appear that the WIPO Internet Treaties offered too little too early
and, consequently, serve a more technocratic and political—rather than
substantive and legal—role in the future of digital copyright.
CONCLUSION
The importance of copyright’s attention to users has been evident since
the first copyright law of modern history. The British Statute of Anne175
established metes and bounds for consumer experiences of creative
expression, indeed offering mechanisms and processes to curb overly

170. See Jon Swartz, Social-Networking Sites Going Global, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2008,
at 3B.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., WIPO, Development Agenda Proposal, supra note 146, Annex, at 1.
174. On some important issues regarding private norms in international copyright law, see
generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private Ordering and the Creation of International
Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 161, 173–74 (2004).
175. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Author’s or Purchasers of Such Copies, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 36, 36–38 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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aggressive exercises of the new property rights.176 Similarly, in the United
States, state copyright laws also recognized limits to the statutory grant,177
as did the federal scheme that has evolved since the late nineteenth century.
At no time was copyright law ever conceived or designed as the exclusive
repository of authorial interests.178 Instead, copyright law mediated internal
tensions between the creative experiences of authors writing over the
shoulders of giants,179 and of readers or other kinds of users whose
interaction with the subjects of copyright generated a diffuse but important
social value. Art, music, and literature were not only casual entertainment,
but modes of cultural dialogue, critical commentary, reflections on social
and political conditions, and opportunities to express life in invariable
dimensions. The creative and the consumptive processes were inextricable
and unalterably linked, even if not explicitly structured through the early
canons of copyright regulation. The new rights introduced by the WIPO
Internet Treaties threatened to redirect the social value of the copyright
system away from diffusion to containment. But, ultimately, they cannot
alter or overcome the creative engagement of users whose interests are
critical to the capacity of owners and technology suppliers to appropriate
value from technological innovation.

176. See id. § 4 (establishing process for seeking relief from unreasonably high prices for
copyrighted works).
177. See Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 287, 306–07 (2002) (“Between 1783 and 1786, twelve states enacted general
copyright statutes. All these states limited the initial and renewal terms either to those
specified in the Statute of Anne or to a ‘fixed term of twenty or twenty-one years.’” (citing
Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent & Copyright Term: Term Limits & the
Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 350 (2000))). For example,
Pennsylvania’s statute granted “‘the exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending the
same, within this state, for the term of fourteen years.’” Francine Crawford, Preconstitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 11, 21–22 (1975)
(quoting 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 TO 1801, at 272 (1906)).
Some colonial laws also specifically excluded foreign works from the scope of protection.
Id. at 21.
178. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm. Print 1961)
(“The ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning and culture
for the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time is a
means to that end.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1107 (1990) (noting that the goal of copyright law is “to stimulate activity and
progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public”).
179. See Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676). For the history of
this quotation, which was apparently in general use during Isaac Newton’s time, see ROBERT
K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965).

